Japan facing China's strategy in the Pacific

In May 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech in Sydney, Australia, in which he called on his Indian and Australian partners to unite in order to form a solid common front capable of counterbalancing—or at least limiting—China’s growing hegemony in the Pacific region. Japan, an Asian country to which the French president was nevertheless indirectly addressing his call for solidarity, pursues a complex policy in this area increasingly threatened by China, which is asserting its claims with growing confidence over the archipelagos of the China Seas and their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

A major economic actor

Japan’s 125 million inhabitants are becoming increasingly aware of how delicate any diplomatic action toward China in the Pacific region can be. While the Japanese Prime Minister announced in 2016 his desire for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” both in terms of trade and geopolitics, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) directly challenges this ideal of an open maritime space.

Indeed, it is toward the Indian and Pacific Oceans that microphones, cameras, and cannons are now turned. The first reason for this heightened attention to maritime spaces lies in disputes over certain areas. While Japan’s four main islands and the Ryukyu and Ogasawara archipelagos—and their 4.3 million km² of EEZ—appear definitively secured, territorial disputes over the Southern Kuril Islands, occupied by Russia since 1945, Takeshima Island, occupied by South Korea, and Tokodo, claimed by Taiwan, as well as the EEZs surrounding the Okinotori and Minamitori rocks, constitute a growing source of regional tension. The second reason for this attention concerns the resources found in these maritime areas.

The world’s leading fishing power in terms of landed tonnage until 1991, Japan now finds its access to fishery resources restricted—even within its own EEZ. Meanwhile, Chinese overfishing and illegal catches by Chinese and Taiwanese trawlers have suffocated competitors to such an extent that the FAO was forced to impose on China a target of reducing its fishing activity by 15% by 2030, under threat of sanctions. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), hydrocarbons are also abundant beneath the seabed of the China Sea. With an estimated 200 million barrels of oil and between 30 and 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas, their strong concentration around the Senkaku Islands explains the disputes surrounding the archipelago since 1971.

Highly dependent on foreign inputs, the Japanese market relies on imports of natural resources and manufactured goods, even more so since the 2011 tsunami and the subsequent questioning of nuclear energy. In the energy sector, Japan imports 88% of its energy, 75% of which comes from the Middle East and is transported through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. With imports’ share of GDP rising from 15% in 1984 to 20% in 2018, the principle of freedom of navigation and access to major trans-Pacific and Indo-Pacific maritime routes becomes a matter of vital importance—conditions essential to Japan’s economic survival.

Beijing’s hegemony in the china seas

Although the blocking of certain straits is often overestimated, the possibility of closures of strategic chokepoints deeply worries Japan in light of Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea. With the rise of the Chinese navy and its harassment of commercial shipping routes, the “Red Giant” raises serious concerns. An increasing number of port terminals are being acquired, built, and managed by Chinese companies. From India to the Middle East and Europe, Mombasa, Gwadar, Colombo, Sittwe, and Piraeus are among the ports, military bases, and naval facilities contributing to China’s so-called “string of pearls” strategy.

Japan turning toward the indo-pacific

The scale of China’s BRI, the historic return of the Chinese fleet to the Pacific, and the lingering effects of Donald Trump’s isolationist policies all contribute to a growing sense of instability in the face of a permanent threat to the global order. China’s economic, diplomatic, and military projections push Japan to turn toward other partners and allies—those who reject this geostrategic hegemony. The United States, now Japan’s primary partner in security cooperation, strongly support Japanese claims, especially since Japan’s adherence to the FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) framework.

A tokyo–new delhi axis?

While 2020 marked a significant rapprochement between the United States and India, Tokyo has also expanded its strategic interest toward the Indian Ocean. Japan’s new strategy is based on shared distrust and has materialised since 2022 through the establishment of security, economic, and humanitarian cooperation, such as “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.” A shared vision of maritime routes and communications has pushed these new partners to establish SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication). Following the publication of a new defence white paper in 2019, Japan replaced South Korea with India as its third-largest security cooperation partner, after the United States and Australia. Since late 2023, the Japanese–Indian partnership, supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has been developing public infrastructure projects and the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor.

Cooperation as a response to chinese pressure

A promoter of multilateral dialogue in the Pacific zone, Japan participates in maritime security workshops within the “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus” and the “ASEAN Regional Forum,” and finances bilateral support policies in Southeast Asia, notably in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. It also combats piracy and illegal fishing at the regional level and sells its P-1 maritime patrol aircraft to Pacific allies.

While its 240,000 troops and €45 billion defence budget do not match China’s €200 billion, Japan’s strength lies in regional cooperation. In 2014, the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution allowed Japan to participate in operations to support its allies, rather than acting solely in cases of self-defence. As early as 2008, Tokyo had indicated that a Chinese attack against Taiwan would be considered a casus belli. Japan’s navy, comprising 155 vessels, 20 submarines, five replenishment ships, and four helicopter carriers, ranks among the world’s five most powerful fleets. Since 2021, an amphibious brigade has even been formed and regularly trained for a potential operation to retake the Senkaku Islands. Despite its discreet rearmament strategy, Japan is clearly developing its air-naval capabilities in response to the expansion of Chinese positions.

By engaging with China’s strategic game, Tokyo hopes to encourage Beijing to contribute to the stabilisation of the Pacific while meeting U.S. expectations by respecting governance rules and the liberal system. Since late 2010, Japan’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific concept has further driven it to open the archipelago to cooperation with those seeking to counterbalance China.