Why the Sahel Has Not Yet Left the CFA Franc

Since 2023, the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have repeatedly announced the end of the currency inherited from colonial rule. Having come to power through coups between 2020 and 2023, then sanctioned and suspended by their neighbours, they broke with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the fifteen-member organisation created in 1975 that provides for the free movement of people and goods and maintains an intervention force. They established their own confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), created by the Liptako-Gourma Charter of 16 September 2023, which now binds them in defence, diplomacy and development. They have endowed it with a bank and a levy.

General Abdourahamane Tiani, head of the presidential guard who became President of Niger following the July 2023 coup, stated in an interview broadcast by Nigerien public television on 11 February 2024 that currency is a marker of sovereignty, that Confederation experts were working on the matter and that, when the time was right, the three states would decide. [1] The announcement was subsequently attributed twice to the heads of state in fabricated communiques, one denied by the Burkinabe presidency on 2 October 2025, the other by the Malian presidency on 23 December 2025. [2]

No official decision followed, and by 2026 the common-currency project still ranked behind the confederal bank, the common customs levy and shared identity documents among the priorities. [3] The currency itself has not moved. The banknotes circulating in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey still bear the signature of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and none of the three governments has sent the letter that, in legal terms, would be sufficient to trigger withdrawal.

One confusion must be dispelled at the outset. ECOWAS does not issue a currency. That function belongs to the West African Monetary Union (WAMU/UMOA), an eight-state grouping that includes the three Sahel countries, governed by a treaty dated 20 January 2007 and whose issuing institution, the BCEAO, is based in Dakar. The monetary union itself underpins the broader West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA), created in 1994, which adds a common external tariff, fiscal convergence criteria and a Court of Justice, discussed below. That makes three treaties and two courts. No legal instrument requires a state to leave all three simultaneously. On 29 January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS while remaining members of the other two.

If action has not followed rhetoric, it is not because the law prevents withdrawal: the exit route is set out explicitly in the treaty. Rather, a series of financial, technical and political constraints, rarely considered together in public commentary, makes departure far more costly than announcing it.

What the CFA franc actually does

The CFA franc operates through a fixed parity, meaning that the exchange rate does not fluctuate with supply and demand: it is set by a legal instrument that the central bank undertakes to uphold regardless of circumstances. One euro is worth 655.957 CFA francs, and that rate has changed only once since independence, in January 1994, when a 50 per cent devaluation was decided in Dakar and implemented overnight. [4] A Sahelian importer therefore knows in advance how much a container invoiced in euros will cost, while a cotton or gold exporter cannot rely on depreciation to undercut competitors.

A fixed parity never sustains itself; it requires a guarantor, and in this case that guarantor is the French Treasury. The commitment dates back to the currency's creation on 26 December 1945, under the name franc des colonies francaises d'Afrique: Paris then undertook to exchange the currency without limit for French francs. Independence did not abolish the arrangement; it placed it on a contractual footing through the monetary cooperation agreements of 1973 and then 2019.

For decades, the counterpart to the guarantee had a name: the operations account, an account held at the French Treasury into which the BCEAO was required to deposit part of its foreign-exchange reserves, in return for which France would cover any overdraft. The account was closed in 2019, but the guarantee survived, now with a quantified trigger: it becomes operative when the ratio between the BCEAO's average external assets - its foreign-currency and gold reserves - and its sight liabilities - banknotes in circulation and deposits repayable on demand - falls to 20 per cent or below. [5] Beyond that threshold, Paris supplies the missing euros so that the CFA franc can continue to be exchanged at the fixed rate.

There remains the mechanism least often discussed, yet arguably the most consequential for the three Sahel states. Article 36 of the BCEAO Statutes prohibits the central bank from providing monetary financing to member states' Treasuries, and direct advances, suspended in 1999, were abolished in 2010. [6] [7] No government in the Union can therefore print money to pay civil servants or soldiers: it must raise CFA francs on the regional government-securities market, where the eight Treasuries issue bills and bonds purchased by banks in the zone in exchange for a yield. For three countries that have been financing a war for more than a decade, this prohibition is the central constraint. It explains both Sahelian frustration and the difficulty of an exit that cannot be reduced to a political decision.

Why Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave

The first grievance is political, and longstanding. The currency's colonial genealogy makes it a natural target in countries where breaking with Paris has structured official discourse since 2022. The three governments have expelled French forces, denounced defence agreements, closed military bases and renegotiated tax agreements. As these ties fell away, the currency became the last visible symbol of the relationship, one handled every day and still bearing, in its very name, the imprint of the colonial period.

There is also the experience of 2022, examined in detail below. Within days, Mali discovered that a Union body could cut it off from its own treasury, freeze its assets and prevent it from servicing a debt payment. The lesson drawn in Bamako, and subsequently in Ouagadougou and Niamey, was straightforward: sharing a currency with neighbours that disapprove of your regime gives them leverage over your budget.

The third motive is macroeconomic and is rarely framed in these terms. The BCEAO sets a single policy rate for eight economies - 3.00 per cent since 16 March 2026 - after average inflation in the Union fell to zero in 2025. This is the rate at which the central bank lends to commercial banks and, through the transmission mechanism, it shapes the cost of credit across the Union. [8] Such a level may suit a coastal economy that exports cocoa, attracts capital and borrows on international markets.

It is less well aligned with the needs of a state that must equip an army, maintain roads disrupted by armed groups and pay public employees in areas where the administration has receded. A national currency would, in theory, allow the authorities to adjust this price to local conditions and directly finance expenditure that the regional market currently funds on its own terms.

The final motive is institutional. In an eight-member union, the three countries hold three votes, leaving them structurally in a minority on every decision that affects them, from interest rates to sanctions. The governorship of the central bank, held since 2022 by Ivorian Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, has never gone to any of the three, and the institution is headquartered in Dakar.

Why withdrawal has not occurred

The foreign-exchange reserves of the eight states are pooled in Dakar, where the BCEAO's December 2025 economic update placed them at 4.2 months of imports - enough to pay for 4.2 months of foreign purchases if all external receipts were to stop - down from 4.9 months a year earlier. [9] These reserves belong to the Union rather than to individual states, and the treaty nowhere specifies how they should be divided: not according to capital shares, exports or population. A departing state must therefore negotiate its share without any written benchmark, facing seven partners with no incentive to be generous, and from an even weaker bargaining position once its departure date has already been fixed.

The problem is compounded by an immediate budgetary constraint. The three Treasuries finance themselves in CFA francs on the regional government-securities market, through banks many of which are headquartered in Abidjan, Dakar, Lome or Casablanca. Leaving the currency without leaving the debt means repaying obligations in a currency one no longer controls, while the burden rises mechanically if the new currency depreciates. The obvious solution - redenominating the securities - would be interpreted by investors as a default and could close the market at precisely the moment when the three states would need it most.

Depreciation would reach far beyond the debt burden. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are landlocked and import their fuel, fertiliser and most of their equipment, with invoices denominated in euros and dollars. A currency that loses 30 per cent of its value makes those purchases 30 per cent more expensive, and the increase would appear in the markets of Bamako or Niamey within weeks, before any benefit from monetary sovereignty had materialised.

All of this ultimately runs up against a paradox that advocates of withdrawal often sidestep: the existing regime delivers a degree of price stability that few neighbouring countries enjoy. Inflation in the Union averaged zero in 2025 and minus 0.8 per cent in the fourth quarter, while policy rates stood at 18 per cent in Ghana and 26.5 per cent in Nigeria over the same period. [10] Withdrawal would therefore mean exchanging an anchor that functions for a form of sovereignty whose returns remain unproven - a politically defensible trade-off, but one that would be costly in the short term for populations already living through war. The practical obstacles are better understood through history than through theory.

What the 2019 reform removed from the debate

The most common charge against the CFA franc concerned the operations account, through which foreign-exchange reserves were centralised at the French Treasury. That criticism accurately described the monetary cooperation agreement of 4 December 1973, which remained unchanged for forty-six years. [11] It no longer describes the applicable legal framework. The agreement signed in Abidjan on 21 December 2019 replaced the 1973 accord: the centralisation of reserves ended, the operations account was closed, and French representatives withdrew from the BCEAO's Board of Directors and Monetary Policy Committee, as well as from the Banking Commission. [12] Paris retains one function: that of guarantor. The BCEAO retains unlimited access to the guarantor should official reserves be exhausted, under a guarantee agreement signed with the Governor. [13] The bill approving the agreement was adopted by the French National Assembly in December 2020 and examined by the Senate in early 2021. [14]

Yet what survived the reform matters more for withdrawal than what it abolished, because exit can no longer consist simply of repatriating reserves that are no longer held in Paris. It shifts exchange-rate risk from an external guarantor onto a national budget already financing a war.

Four precedents, only one return

There is historical experience, and it is instructive: four states have already taken the step. Guinea left in 1960 and created the Guinean franc. Mali followed two years later. Madagascar and Mauritania withdrew in 1973, the year in which the monetary cooperation agreements between France and its former colonies were renegotiated, suggesting that these departures were less isolated ruptures than part of a broader renegotiation of the system. [15] The BCEAO dates Mali's withdrawal to 30 June 1962 and its reintegration to 17 February 1984. [16] In the intervening period, the Malian franc had lost half its value against the CFA franc by 1967, and the return was negotiated at a rate of two Malian francs to one CFA franc.

Twenty-two years. That is the time between Mali's withdrawal and its return, and it is the figure most often omitted by advocates of a rapid exit. There is also a less discussed, almost logistical detail: both national currencies were manufactured abroad - the Malian franc in Czechoslovakia, and the Guinean franc by a European printer whose identity differs across sources, British according to some and Czechoslovak according to others. [17]

The operation had to remain secret until the last possible moment; otherwise, holders of the old currency would have converted it en masse or moved it out of the country before the exchange, draining the new issuer's reserves. Hence the scene on 29 February 1960: at ten o'clock in the evening, staff at the National Printing Office in Conakry were summoned to work, the army and police surrounded the premises, and employees were not released until the proclamation had been broadcast to the public the following morning. [18] Before it is a doctrine, a national currency is a banknote-printing contract, escorted convoys and exchange counters capable of replacing the old notes with the new before the parallel market sets its own rate.

2022, or the cost of monetary-union membership

Membership of the monetary union has a cost, one that Mali experienced directly in its treasury. On 9 January 2022 in Accra, the WAEMU Conference of Heads of State suspended the country from its bodies, cut it off from Union financing institutions and endorsed ECOWAS sanctions imposed after the junta postponed the elections it had promised. [19] The BCEAO froze the assets of the state and public enterprises, then blocked transfers passing through its payment systems. On 28 January, a CFAF 2.6 billion coupon was not paid on fungible Treasury bonds, debt securities issued in successive tranches with identical characteristics and purchased by regional banks to place their liquidity. Economy and Finance Minister Alousseni Sanou stated that Mali's assets on the central bank's books were more than sufficient. [20] A state can therefore be cut off from its own money by an institution it partly owns.

The judicial proceedings lasted four years. Bamako brought the case before the WAEMU Court of Justice in February 2022, obtained a suspension of the sanctions on 24 March, saw the heads of state lift them in July 2023, and prevailed on the merits on 28 January 2026: the decisions of 9 January 2022 were annulled for lack of a legal basis, including a violation of Article 4 of the BCEAO Statutes, which protects the central bank's independence. [21] The judgment gives the Confederation two contradictory arguments. It shows that the monetary instrument was used for purposes beyond monetary policy, strengthening the case for exit. It also shows that an internal legal remedy can ultimately succeed, strengthening the case for remaining.

The door is open - and written into the treaty

The remaining question is what withdrawal would entail in practical terms, since public debate almost always assumes that it would amount to a leap into a legal unknown. It would not. The 2007 Monetary Union Treaty provides for withdrawal in Article 36, not to be confused with Article 36 of the central bank's Statutes discussed above.

Any member state may withdraw. Its decision must be notified to the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Union's supreme body, and it takes effect automatically 180 days later, a period the parties may shorten by mutual agreement. [22] Article 7 lists formal acknowledgement of a withdrawal among the Conference's powers, alongside admission and exclusion. [23] To acknowledge is not to authorise. The seven other states have no veto over the departure of an eighth.

Then comes the paragraph that is almost never cited. The Council of Ministers approves the draft agreements that the BCEAO concludes with the government that has notified its withdrawal - in other words, the liquidation agreements that settle accounts between the departing state and the common institution. [24]

The treaty does not specify what those agreements must contain, and that is where the decisive questions lie: the departing state's share in the BCEAO's capital, the banknotes circulating on its territory, the division of external assets, and the cross-claims between the Treasury, the banks and the issuing institution. The 180 days run from the date of notification, not from the conclusion of these negotiations. A state may therefore find itself outside the Union while the division of assets remains unresolved, which is the worst possible bargaining position.

The text also provides for involuntary withdrawal. A state that fails to meet its obligations and does not comply with a judgment of the WAEMU Court of Justice may have the Conference determine, unanimously among the other members, that it has manifested a willingness to withdraw, through analogous application of Article 107(3) of the WAEMU Treaty. [25] No one activated this procedure against Bamako, Ouagadougou or Niamey, even at the height of the 2022 crisis. It nevertheless remains available.

Sovereignty is financed in the currency it seeks to leave

In late March 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger introduced a 0.5 per cent confederal levy on imports from countries outside the Alliance, presented as the foundation of autonomous financing. [26] They then endowed the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development with an announced initial capital of CFAF 500 billion, under an agreement signed in Bamako in May 2025, followed by an institutional launch in December and the appointment of a president in February 2026. [27] The levy is collected in CFA francs. The capital is denominated in CFA francs. The projects it finances will be paid for in CFA francs. At the fixed parity, CFAF 500 billion is worth about EUR 762 million for three countries with a combined population of more than 70 million. The contradiction is not rhetorical but fiscal: no other unit of account yet exists in which to raise and spend these resources, and funding would have to continue throughout the years required for a transition.

The levy also has an effect that its designers did not foreground. While the three countries belonged to ECOWAS, their trade with other members benefited from the Community's trade-liberalisation scheme, under which originating goods were exempt from customs duties. Since withdrawal, those goods count as third-country imports and are subject to the levy, raising the cost of supply chains that largely run through Abidjan, Lome and Cotonou. Three landlocked countries are therefore taxing their own trade corridors.

Three scenarios for the next five years

The first scenario is negotiated continuity, the most likely outcome in the short term. The three states remain in the monetary union, use the judgment of 28 January 2026 to demand safeguards over the use of sanctions, and press for stronger representation within its institutions.

The second is the creation of a confederal currency shared by the Alliance states and pegged to a basket of currencies, with the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development serving as an institutional embryo. This path would require establishing a central bank, building reserves, awarding banknote-printing contracts and creating a separate banking-supervision framework; otherwise, subsidiaries of regional banking groups would find themselves subject to two contradictory regulatory regimes.

A Maghreb precedent gives a sense of the timetable. Morocco began moving from a fixed to a more flexible exchange-rate regime in 2018, gradually widening the dirham's fluctuation band - the maximum permitted deviation between the daily market rate and a central reference rate. The band widened from plus or minus 0.3 to plus or minus 2.5 per cent on 15 January 2018 around a central rate based 60 per cent on the euro and 40 per cent on the dollar, then to plus or minus 5 per cent on 9 March 2020; it has not moved since. [29] Eight years for five per cent of latitude, in a country that is neither landlocked nor at war.

The third scenario is rapid withdrawal followed by a float, meaning the abandonment of any exchange rate fixed in advance: the new currency trades each day at the price set by buyers and sellers of foreign exchange, and that price can fall sharply if confidence is weak. Its cost is the best documented of the three scenarios. A fixed parity holds because someone undertakes to supply foreign currency whenever demand exceeds supply: either an external guarantor, as the French Treasury does today, or a stock of reserves held by the central bank itself.

Without one or the other, an announced peg cannot survive sustained net outflows of foreign currency, and the effective exchange rate forms elsewhere. Neighbouring Algeria offers a durable illustration. The dinar is an administered currency whose official rate is set by the Bank of Algeria rather than by the market, and convertibility remains restricted for individuals. The official rate is around 151 dinars to the euro, while the parallel market in Algiers trades at between 275 and 282, implying a premium of more than 80 per cent. The International Monetary Fund's Article IV mission, whose conclusions were published on 6 July 2026, noted that the premium remained high despite measures taken by the Bank of Algeria. [30]

What is really at stake

The issue extends beyond the symbolic question of French tutelage. What Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are seeking to recover is the ability to finance a war without requiring the permission of a market or a guarantor. What they risk in return will be measured in fuel prices and the cost of credit - in household budgets rather than state budgets. The Union's five other members have their own calculation: a joint departure would remove three countries and part of the common reserve pool, and no one in Abidjan or Dakar is eager to discover what the French guarantee is worth in a smaller union. For France, little remains of the West African arrangement: since 2019, its presence has been reduced to a guarantee line that remains invisible unless the day comes when it must be used.

A letter and 180 days are enough to leave. Building a currency takes years, as Mali knows after taking twenty-two years to return. It is this mismatch in timelines, far more than the law, that explains the present situation: a confederation that has announced its monetary break for three years while, in the meantime, paying for its bank and its customs arrangements in CFA francs.

Notes and sources

[1] « Général A. Tiani: la monnaie est un symbole de souveraineté que nous sommes engagés à recouvrer totalement pour sortir de la colonisation », ActuNiger, 12 February 2024, https://www.actuniger.com/politique/19899-general-a-tiani-la-monnaie-est-un-symbole-de-souverainete-que-nous-sommes-engages-a-recouvrer-totalement-pour-sortir-de-la-colonisation.html

[2] « Les pays de l'AES mettent fin au franc CFA? Un faux communiqué et de fausses images », France 24, 7 October 2025, https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20251007-pays-aes-fin-franc-cfa-faux-communique-fausses-images; « Faux, l'AES n'a pas lancé de monnaie commune appelée Sahel », Fact-Check Congo, 23 December 2025, https://factcheck-congo.org/2025/12/23/faux-laes-na-pas-lance-de-monnaie-commune-appelee-sahel/.

[3] « Souveraineté financière de l'AES: banque confédérale, douane commune et monnaie », Sahel Watch, 2026, https://sahel.watch/souverainete-financiere-aes-banque-bcid-douane-monnaie-2026/.

[4] Banque de France, « Les coopérations monétaires Afrique-France », factsheet, 23 April 2025, https://www.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/Fiche_CMAF_23.04.2025.pdf.

[5] France-WAMU Cooperation Agreement of 21 December 2019, guarantee activation mechanism, analysed in « Colloque sur la réforme du franc CFA en Afrique de l'Ouest », Afronomicslaw, 11 January 2022, https://www.afronomicslaw.org/category/analysis/colloque-sur-la-reforme-du-franc-cfa-en-afrique-de-louest-la-reforme-du-franc-cfa.

[6] Statutes of the Central Bank of West African States, Art. 36, https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2017-11/StatutsBCEAO2010%20(2).pdf

[7] Banque de France, « Éléments explicatifs des spreads souverains en UEMOA », https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications-et-statistiques/publications/elements-explicatifs-des-spreads-souverains-en-uemoa.

[8] « UEMOA: la BCEAO abaisse ses taux directeurs pour soutenir la croissance », Agence Ecofin, 5 March 2026, https://www.agenceecofin.com/actualites-finance/0503-136359-uemoa-la-bceao-abaisse-ses-taux-directeurs-pour-soutenir-la-croissance; « Réserves de change: pourquoi elles décident de la solidité des économies africaines », Afrique sur 7, 2026, https://www.afrique-sur7.fr/reserves-de-change-afrique-2026.

[9] BCEAO, Note de conjoncture économique dans les pays de l'UEMOA, December 2025, https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2026-01/Note-de-conjoncture-economique-des-pays-de-l-UEMOA_Decembre-2025.pdf.

[10] Ibid.

[11] French Senate, Report No. 289 (2020-2021), prepared on behalf of the Finance Committee on the bill authorising approval of the cooperation agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Governments of the member states of the West African Monetary Union, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l20-289/l20-289_mono.html.

[12] Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Governments of the member states of the West African Monetary Union, signed in Abidjan on 21 December 2019, Arts. 2 and 10, text annexed to Bill No. 2986, French National Assembly, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b2986_accord-international.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Direction générale du Trésor, « L'accord de coopération monétaire entre la France et l'UEMOA approuvé à l'Assemblée nationale », 10 December 2020, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2020/12/10/l-accord-de-cooperation-monetaire-entre-la-france-et-l-uemoa-approuve-a-l-assemblee-nationale.

[15] Banque de France, op. cit.

[16] BCEAO, « L'histoire de la BCEAO », reproduced by Afriquinfos, https://afriquinfos.com/theme/bceao-senegal/.

[17] « Franc CFA: il y a 50 ans, la Mauritanie et Madagascar quittaient la zone franc, après la Guinée et le Mali », Financial Afrik, 19 September 2023, https://www.financialafrik.com/2023/09/19/franc-cfa-il-y-a-50-ans-la-mauritanie-et-madagascar-quittaient-la-zone-franc-apres-la-guinee-et-le-mali/; « Brève histoire de la monnaie guinéenne, de 1958 à nos jours », Mediaguinee, August 2026, https://mediaguinee.com/2026/08/breve-histoire-de-la-monnaie-guineenne-de-1958-a-nos-jours-independance-operation-persil-syli-et-les-six-visages-dune-souverainete-monetaire-disputee-par-sekou-oumar-sylla

[18] André Lewin, Ahmed Sékou Touré (1922-1984), President of Guinea from 1958 to 1984, vol. 4, ch. 42, « 1er mars 1960, la Guinée sort de la zone franc », https://www.webguinee.net/bibliotheque/histoire/andre-lewin/sekou-toure-president/volume-4/chapitre42.html.

[19] « Sanctions contre le pays: la Cour de justice de l'UEMOA désavoue les chefs d'État ouest-africains », AllAfrica, 30 January 2026, https://allafrica.com/stories/202601300372.html.

[20] « Mali: le ministre de l'Économie dénonce le gel des avoirs de l'État par la BCEAO », Eurafrica, 3 February 2022, https://eurafrica.info/2022/02/03/mali-le-ministre-de-leconomie-denonce-le-gel-des-avoirs-de-letat-par-la-bceao/.

[21] « Mali: la Cour de l'UEMOA reconnaît l'illégalité des sanctions de 2022 », La Nouvelle Tribune, 29 January 2026, https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/01/mali-la-cour-de-luemoa-reconnait-lillegalite-des-sanctions-de-2022/.

[22] Treaty of the West African Monetary Union, 20 January 2007, Art. 36, text published by Senegal's Direction de la réglementation et de la supervision des systèmes financiers décentralisés, https://drs-sfd.gouv.sn/sitedrs/index.php/2018/01/05/traite-de-lunion-monetaire-ouest-africaine/

[23] Ibid., Art. 7.

[24] Ibid., Art. 36.

[25] Amended Treaty of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, Art. 107(3), WAEMU Court of Justice, https://new.courdejusticeuemoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Traite-modifie.pdf

[26] « La Banque confédérale AES accélère son déploiement avant fin 2025 », Afrik.com, https://www.afrik.com/la-banque-confederale-aes-accelere-son-deploiement-avant-fin-2025.

[27] « AES: une banque d'investissement et de développement avec un capital initial de 500 milliards FCFA », Horonya Finance, 24 May 2025, https://horonyafinance.com/2025/05/24/aes-une-banque-dinvestissement-et-de-developpement-avec-un-capital-initial-de-10-milliards-de-dollars/; « Au Mali, lancement officiel de la Banque confédérale d'investissement et de développement de l'AES », RFI, reproduced by AllAfrica, 13 December 2025, https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202512130209.html.

[28] « Souveraineté financière de l'AES: banque confédérale, douane commune et monnaie », Sahel Watch, 2026, https://sahel.watch/souverainete-financiere-aes-banque-bcid-douane-monnaie-2026/.

[29] « Mise en oeuvre de la réforme du régime de change », Bank Al-Maghrib, https://www.bkam.ma/Trouvez-l-information-concernant/Reforme-du-regime-de-change/Mise-en-oeuvre-de-la-reforme

[30] « Taux de change en Algérie: ce que recommande le FMI », ObservAlgérie, 9 July 2026, dhttps://observalgerie.com/2026/07/09/economie/taux-de-change-en-algerie-ce-que-recommande-le-fmi; « Dinar algérien: comment le double marché de change menace l'économie », ObservAlgérie, 21 December 2025, dhttps://observalgerie.com/2025/12/21/economie/dinar-algerien-comment-le-double-marche-de-change-menace-leconomie.