Demography, The Unspoken Weapon In The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Two peoples claiming one and the same territory. This confrontation fuels debates and passions across the Levant, and its developments regularly make international headlines. First referred to as the “Arab-Israeli” conflict and later reduced to the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict as we know it today, it symbolises a diplomatically intractable struggle whose outcome appears increasingly shaped by the Israeli bombardments devastating the population of Gaza.

Between 2008 and 2021, both sides were responsible for more than 7,000 deaths: 5,590 on the Palestinian side and 853 on the Israeli side. The year 2022 was considered the deadliest since the 2005 Intifada, with 150 Palestinian deaths and 30 Israeli deaths. Looking further back, approximately 13,000 Palestinians and 3,700 Israelis lost their lives between 1948 and 1993.

This conflict has the particularity of remaining current since 1948. It has continuously preoccupied and mobilised international actors and authorities. In 2023, it is both a contemporary and a historical issue. Yet this article proposes to analyse it through a demographic lens. Since the massive arrival of Jews in 1948, the annexation of several territories in 1967, and the renewed occupation and expropriation policies of recent years, demography may not dominate public debate, but it lies at the heart of the strategies and policies of both camps.

Demography, What Is The Point?

While demography does not claim to explain everything, it provides insight into the condition of a territory, its citizens, a generation, and even prevailing mentalities. It is “the quantitative and qualitative study of population characteristics and their dynamics.” In less abstract terms, it allows for the construction of a broad statistical portrait of a territory by integrating specific data such as birth rates, fertility rates, mortality rates, marriage rates, and migration flows, and by interpreting these averages.

However, this tool does not offer a complete understanding of society. Samuel Huntington’s theory, for instance, which attempted to explain political violence in Maghreb societies through the strong presence of youth populations, must be approached with caution. In this article, demography serves solely to revisit traditional and often binary analytical frameworks and to offer a renewed perspective on an already well-known situation.

A People Is A Number

Since the creation of the State of Israel and the subsequent annexation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem, population and settlement have become central issues for both sides. In occupied territories and in Jerusalem itself, the question of ethnic majority weighs heavily. Population growth rates are closely monitored, as are movements and arrivals.

The “clash of civilisations” may no longer serve as a useful analytical tool in international relations, yet it appears to resonate with the mentalities of both camps: whoever is the majority is at home, and whoever is at home is legitimate.

The Beginnings Of A Population Policy

Demographic considerations quickly became intertwined with the necessities of the Israeli state. Even before its official creation, in the aftermath of the Second World War, policies encouraging early marriages were promoted to ensure demographic growth. The 1950 “Law of Return” allowed any Jewish person able to demonstrate a link to Jewish identity or tradition to obtain Israeli citizenship, while Palestinians were denied similar rights despite proof of residence or familial belonging in Israel.

When David Ben-Gurion came to power in 1955, he pursued an explicit population policy, appealing to patriotic sentiment with the warning: “We are bound to become a minority.” He even established a prize bearing his name to reward families with more than ten children. Later, Golda Meir, who succeeded him from 1969 to 1974, introduced the foundations of a discriminatory policy toward Palestinians and expressed open disdain toward Sephardic Jews, whom she considered less educated. Both quality and quantity became political concerns.

Palestine, A Demographic Growth Objective

On the Palestinian side, reactions were immediate. From the 1950s until the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Palestinian women had on average eight children, five more than Jewish women, who averaged three children until the 2000s. In the 1970s, Yasser Arafat, founder of the Palestine Liberation Organization, reportedly urged wives to bear twelve children, stating: “Two for them, two for the family, and eight for Palestine.”

Mahmoud Abbas responded symbolically to the Ben-Gurion prize by creating financial assistance of approximately 4,000 US dollars for couples experiencing difficulties in having additional children. Over roughly three decades, the womb became, in the eyes of political leaders, both a political instrument and a strategic weapon.

Demographic Erasure Through Territorial Exclusivity

Despite moments of relative détente encouraged by negotiations — notably the iconic handshake at the White House during the Oslo Accords (1993) and Oslo II (1995) — the early 2000s marked a deterioration in bilateral relations and the emergence of unprecedented assertive policies within the Israeli state. As territorial incursions expanded and political leadership shifted further to the right, Israel revived its population-focused policies.

In 2003, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a total ban on family reunification rights. Palestinians married to residents of the West Bank or Gaza were effectively barred from living together in Israel. In 2011, the Admissions Committee Law allowed Jewish communities of fewer than 400 families to reject Palestinian applicants. In 2018, the Nation-State Law defined Israel as a state in which “only the Jewish people have the right to self-determination,” encouraging exclusively Jewish settlement and removing Arabic from its status as an official language.

Nationalism Revived By The New Knesset

During the elections for the 25th Israeli parliament in 2022, demographic and ideological divides deepened. Members of the Knesset themselves reflected high fertility rates, averaging three children per member across parties and up to eight among representatives of far-right parties. This renewed natalist policy, encouraged by an increasingly radical government, aims to cease what National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir described as being “burdened by the secular.” By 2021, Israel’s fertility rate of 3.13 children per woman had already surpassed that of Palestine, which stood at 2.83.

What Can Demography Predict?

With growing nationalist and ultra-right representation in successive Knessets and the intensification of natalist policies, demographic projections anticipate a Jewish majority at the national level by 2065, with 16 million Jews compared to 14 million Palestinians, according to Nitzan Perelman, Director of Studies at IREMMO and lecturer at Paris 1.

Since the events of 7 October 2023, Israeli bombardments, the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, water shortages, and famine in the Gaza enclave have evidently accelerated previously identified trends. These figures must be nuanced, as they do not account for the Palestinian diaspora, estimated at approximately one million, nor for non-Jewish non-citizens within Israel.

Nevertheless, demographic advantage remains a powerful argument that may ultimately tip a balance already leaning toward Israel. Can one wager on the longevity of this conflict in light of historical developments? Should one be concerned about this “expiration date” of a Palestinian majority, compounded by ongoing Israeli expropriations and the existential threats weighing on the Palestinian people since October 2023? The question remains open.