Is nato becoming constraining?

Thucydides said shortly before his death, “The balance of fear is the only guarantee of an alliance.” So has NATO, born out of the fear of a Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, outlived its purpose in this multipolar world? How does NATO function in the aftermath of the Cold War, deprived of its original objective? Has it become the symbol of a striking imbalance in transatlantic cooperation between Europe and the United States? How and why has it become such a constraining organisation that American power appears increasingly detached from it?

NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a political and military alliance headquartered in Brussels. It brings together 30 countries from Europe and North America, as well as Turkey, a Near Eastern country, and operates under the authority of a Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states. These states organise their defence collectively and cooperate in political and security matters with the aim of providing mutual military assistance in the event of aggression.

The instrument of hegemony

Endowed with significant operational resources, the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty, synonymous with Western power and cooperation, dates back to 4 April 1949. In a context of a devastated Europe unable to defend itself against a Soviet attack, twelve countries decided to unite while placing themselves under the protective wing of Uncle Sam and his Marshall Plan. “An attack against one member shall be considered an attack against all,” declared President Truman, addressing indirectly the Soviet leadership in this bipolar post-war world. Until the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991 and the dissolution of its Warsaw Pact, created in response to NATO, the organisation’s sole purpose was to deter the USSR from any expansion towards Western Europe.

Post-cold war nato

Unable to rely on the fear of a communist threat after its collapse, and in the absence of comparable emerging threats, NATO saw its very existence questioned but ultimately survived the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc. In 1989, Secretary of State James Baker had recommended adapting NATO’s functions to reflect the evolving European geopolitical landscape. However, the will to preserve the most visible institutional link of transatlantic cooperation prevailed. Divergences among partners regarding NATO’s decisions were overshadowed by a shared foundation of values and interests. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the organisation expanded its scope to crisis management and peacekeeping missions, diversifying its means of action beyond its borders. Countries attached to strict sovereignty, such as China, Russia, or India, viewed this development unfavourably.

Numerous missions carried out and ongoing

NATO became involved in the Second Gulf War in 2003, provided assistance to victims of the devastating earthquake in Pakistan and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. It also supported the Libyan people in 2011 and opposed Muammar Gaddafi by imposing embargoes, establishing no-fly zones, and conducting air and naval strikes against regime forces condemned for systematic human rights violations.

Today, NATO deploys military and diplomatic efforts through various ongoing missions. The 3,700 troops deployed in Kosovo aim to establish a secure environment, maintain order, facilitate dialogue with Serbia, and support humanitarian initiatives. In the Mediterranean, counter-terrorism operations have been conducted since 2001 under “Operation Active Endeavour,” replaced in 2016 by “Sea Guardian.” In Iraq, the NATO Mission Iraq has sought since 2018 to assist and progressively strengthen Iraqi institutions and security forces. NATO also firmly supports the African Union, having assisted Sudan in 2005, Somalia in 2007, and providing expertise and training to the African Standby Force.

Thus, NATO gradually promotes democratic values and enhances its diplomatic dimension, emphasising peaceful conflict resolution. Since the late 1990s, it has focused on combating terrorism, cyber-attacks, assisting populations in danger, safeguarding territorial integrity, and more recently supporting civil efforts against the pandemic within member states. While the fall of the Berlin Wall threatened its existence, NATO has instead accelerated and diversified its operations, with increased participation from member states beyond the United States.

However, a striking imbalance persists between American power and that of the other member states. The expansion of membership and the well-known Article 5 also represent significant constraints on effective cooperation.

American supremacy

According to NATO’s official data, since the 2010s the United States has contributed approximately 70% of the organisation’s budget. In 2017, it spent $683 billion, representing around 72% of total defence expenditures within the Alliance. Like a majority shareholder in a large corporation, the United States has repeatedly launched operations without NATO’s approval, or even despite the disapproval of other international organisations such as the United Nations.

In 1999, Bill Clinton launched an air operation in Kosovo after diplomatic efforts failed. The same year, NATO’s intervention in Serbia, conducted without UN authorisation, culminated in “accidental” air strikes on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In 2003, the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq served as justification for U.S. action without a UN mandate and against the explicit opposition of Germany, Russia, and France, which rejected military intervention against Saddam Hussein.

Faced with this proclaimed American independence within the organisation, Europe has observed the overwhelming power of the United States and the limited strategic autonomy of the continent within NATO.

The imperative of european autonomy

While this imbalance was less problematic during the bipolar Cold War era, it becomes more so in limited conflicts where European interests and risks are directly at stake. It has thus become imperative for Europe to strengthen its own military and decision-making capacities. President Emmanuel Macron has championed the concept of European sovereignty, attempting to promote it during France’s presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Yet such a sovereignty, exclusively European, is viewed with suspicion by certain NATO member states. Warsaw, for instance, remains deeply concerned about Russian advances in Ukraine and sees little benefit in the United States reducing its commitment to Europe’s defence.

Despite Polish reluctance to acknowledge it, NATO faces several challenges. A strong advocate of European sovereignty, the French President notably declared on 8 November 2018 to journalists from The Economist that NATO was experiencing “brain death.”

Nato in a state of “brain death”?

He criticised the lack of coordination between the United States and Europe, as well as Turkey’s unilateral behaviour during the Syrian episode, and called for clearer strategic guidelines to reinforce NATO’s defence posture. Despite Turkey’s strategic importance as the Alliance’s only Muslim-majority member, certain behaviours have been deemed incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty. President Erdoğan’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles and his pressure on Sweden regarding Kurdish refugees raised serious questions about NATO’s unity.

“If Bashar al-Assad attacks Turkey, are we truly prepared to engage alongside Erdoğan?” Emmanuel Macron asked journalists in 2019. Originally composed of 12 members, NATO now counts 30. In light of these disagreements, has American expansionism become counterproductive?

30 countries with divergent interests

In 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic voluntarily joined NATO, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and later Albania and Croatia in 2009. This enlargement has made collective decision-making increasingly complex, as illustrated by tensions involving Turkey and Sweden. Even former Secretary General Lord Robertson acknowledged during the era of “NATO of 19” that full consensus was impossible due to profound political differences, notably during debates over Iraq. These reflections on NATO’s unity raise questions about the cornerstone of the Treaty: Article 5.

Article 5: the cornerstone of nato

Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all, and that the Alliance will take necessary measures to assist the attacked state. This binding principle implies that members would be obliged to side with Turkey in the event of conflict, regardless of the opposing party. It requires permanent communication, mutual support, and concessions in pursuit of consensus. For the United States, such constraints may appear disproportionate to the strategic advantages gained.

American disengagement

The Kosovo episode fostered mistrust among American officials. European limitations regarding collateral damage in air operations were perceived as attempts to constrain U.S. military freedom. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States initially declined European offers of assistance in combating terrorism. Freed from NATO constraints, the United States could regain operational freedom, reconnecting with a political tradition rooted in Manifest Destiny and a preference for strategic autonomy.

The natural policy of the united states

If the United States set aside its reluctance toward permanent alliances at the end of the Second World War, its political tradition has long favoured freedom of action. In 1796, President George Washington publicly expressed reservations about binding defence agreements. “The illusion of a common interest cannot long deceive Americans,” he declared. In 2004, both Democrats and Republicans agreed on the need to preserve strategic independence.

From alliance to simple coalition?

The inequality of military and economic means grants greater weight to American arguments. A permanent alliance requiring constant decision-sharing offers limited military advantages compared to the political inconveniences perceived by the United States. The Bush administration favoured a flexible interpretation of Article 5 and tended to view NATO not as a permanent alliance but as a coalition, proposing a “menu-based model” adaptable to each crisis. This transformation into a coalition of convenience reflects a deeper evolution in American thinking regarding NATO’s constraints.

The biden mandate and the new chinese challenge

President Joe Biden revived cooperative processes and attended the June 2021 summit, reaffirming American commitment to the Alliance. While maintaining their leadership role, the United States recognised new threats requiring solidarity. At the Madrid Summit on 30 June 2022, NATO for the first time identified China as a “challenge to its security.” In its Strategic Concept, NATO declared that “China’s ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, our security and our values.”

Greater cohesion in the face of eastern threats

As a defensive organisation, NATO cannot directly attack Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Yet Vladimir Putin’s predictions of NATO’s imminent disintegration proved incorrect. The war in Ukraine strengthened cohesion within the Alliance and reinforced its eastern flank. NATO has expressed readiness to welcome Sweden and Finland, demonstrating resilience in the face of Russian threats.

NATO has endured numerous crises, and its institutional form has repeatedly been questioned. The transatlantic gap temporarily destabilised Western cooperation, and American disengagement encouraged European reflections on strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, the rise of China and the reassertion of Russian power mark a new turning point in an increasingly multipolar world. The United States is compelled to recognise the enduring importance of transatlantic cooperation in confronting Moscow, Beijing, and their deepening strategic partnership aimed at challenging the rules-based international order.