European Pact on Migration – what future for migrants?

On 23 September 2020, the European Commission presented the Pact on Migration and Asylum, aimed at profoundly reforming the system for receiving and managing asylum seekers and migrants arriving at the borders of the European Union. The Pact was presented as a tool capable of better managing the migratory pressure experienced by certain states, strengthening data collection, decriminalising sea rescues, and creating a European Union Agency for Asylum. Migrants largely cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe.

The Western Mediterranean route leads to Spain, both by sea through direct access to the continent and by land via the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, while the Central Mediterranean route leads to Italy and Malta. These routes to European countries were heavily used during the migratory waves of 2015 and 2016, placing Greece, Spain, and Italy on the front line, as responsibility for managing asylum seekers lies primarily with the first country of entry, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation.

After 2015

With 1.28 million asylum applications submitted within the European Union in 2015, the migration crisis exposed the inefficiency of EU migration policy among the 27 member states. Over the past seven years, the annual average of 3,000 missing persons during Mediterranean crossings has continued to highlight the need for concrete action at EU borders to meet both humanitarian and security imperatives, combining protection with legality. To this end, the EU has adopted new policies aimed at better controlling its borders.

As early as 2016, the adoption of controversial agreements with Turkey, followed by Libya in 2017, helped to limit Mediterranean migratory flows. With a total of 600,000 asylum seekers arriving via the Mediterranean in 2022—an increase of 34% compared to 2020, but a decrease of 10% compared to pre-Covid 2019—this policy still appears insufficient to meet member states’ expectations. A few days before the presentation of the Pact, which notably targets the interests of children and graduates, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, declared her intention to “abolish the Dublin system,” which has governed the reception of asylum seekers since the 1990s and is considered ineffective and unfair to frontline countries. Echoing this assessment, the fire that destroyed Europe’s largest refugee camp in Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos prompted Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President of the Commission in charge of migration, to denounce the failure of “a system that is not really a system.”

Migrant and asylum seeker, what is the difference ?

Presented three years ago, the Pact on Migration and Asylum aims to process part of asylum applications outside EU borders, strengthen those borders to deter new departures, and offer member states several options in the event of a migration crisis. However, migration policy—and especially its implementation—is shared between member states and the European Union. Governments must comply with a set of jointly agreed rules, but how can one distinguish between those for whom obtaining a residence permit is vital and those for whom it is less so?

This distinction requires differentiating migrants, who seek better living conditions, from asylum seekers, who flee countries where they are no longer safe. The latter are granted refugee status if the host country recognises that their lives are at risk, according to the criteria of the Geneva Convention. Migration and asylum policies are interconnected, but their objectives differ: the former seeks to regulate legal immigration and combat irregular migration, while the latter aims to offer protection to third-country nationals in need.

One pact, legislative proposals, three main pillars

For asylum seekers and migrants, the European Commission first proposes a regulation introducing a screening procedure at EU borders to combat irregular migration. This relies on the Eurodac system, which collects migrants’ biometric data, including fingerprints, and subjects them to health and security checks. Another regulation proposes replacing the Dublin system to ensure a fairer distribution of responsibilities among member states. “No state should bear a disproportionate responsibility in migration matters; all must contribute to the effort of solidarity,” stated the opening of the Pact. The failure of the mandatory relocation policy introduced in 2016 has given way to greater flexibility regarding how states contribute to solidarity.

In the event of a migration crisis, states may activate a solidarity mechanism by choosing to receive a share of asylum seekers, sponsor the return of irregular migrants by assuming direct responsibility, or provide financial assistance to the state under pressure. On 22 June 2022, 18 EU member states and three associated countries formally approved this solidarity mechanism and committed to several thousand relocations under this framework. Structured around three main pillars—strengthening external borders, ensuring a fairer sharing of responsibility and solidarity, and reinforcing cooperation with third countries—these reforms primarily aim to harmonise European migration policy.

A harmonised european policy

Harmonising the application of migration and asylum policy among member states, and insisting on the uniform enforcement of norms and rules by all states—something that is not always self-evident—would allow European mechanisms to be centralised within a single institution. The European Blue Card, adopted in 2021, aims to facilitate the admission of highly qualified migrants, while the EU Agency for Asylum, created in January 2022, now ensures compliance with these rules. With a budget of €172 million and 500 experts, it provides operational and technical support and offers training to national authorities. The EU also plans to facilitate legal migration by improving the status of long-term residents, easing access to employment and mobility within the Schengen area.

The impact of the ukrainian crisis

Since 24 February 2022, the war in Ukraine has brought new perspectives, sometimes justifying the restriction of migratory flows, sometimes highlighting the importance of acting as a land of refuge. French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin stated: “I think what has happened has created a different sensitivity; everyone is obviously concerned by the European continent and by migration issues.” He subsequently proposed abandoning mandatory relocation quotas, leaving transit countries with the heaviest responsibilities and reducing migratory arrivals in France.

By contrast, Luxembourg’s Minister of Immigration Jean Asselborn declared two months after the outbreak of the war: “We must realise that if we can welcome millions of Ukrainians, we can also take care of thousands of people who do not come from Ukraine but from the South, who suffer from the same conditions and who have a different language and religion.” NGOs have welcomed the agreement but are calling for further clarification. This set of rules and recommendations aims to prevent the EU from reliving the chaos of 2015, when Greece, Italy, and Spain were left alone to receive thousands of asylum seekers fleeing the war in Syria.

Reluctant member states

A “2015 bis” scenario is undesirable in the eyes of the EU, and several member states remain reluctant to embrace solidarity principles. Poland and Hungary’s resistance is joined by that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Together, they form the Visegrad Group, whose members prefer to manage and repel extra-European migratory flows individually, clinging to their sovereignty and refusing any obligation to accept quotas. Denmark, pursuing a similar approach, rejects all asylum applications under a “zero refugees” policy. For the past six years, out of several thousand applications, only 1% have been granted residence permits.

Post-Brexit England, now outside the EU, attempted to deport the first individuals targeted by its externalisation policy to Rwanda by plane. The European Court of Human Rights, seized by NGOs, ultimately grounded the aircraft, ruling that British authorities must first ensure the safety of the destination country. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees also condemned the plan, highlighting Rwanda’s poor human rights record and noting that the agreement violated the UK’s international obligations. A timeline tracing the evolution of debates and European migration legislation in 2022 is available on the website of the European Council.

An eu moving towards externalisation?

Beyond the Visegrad Group and the examples cited, emerging far-right movements in Europe argue that exiles should apply for asylum from their countries of origin, ignoring the realities of conflict, war, persecution, or death threats that make such procedures impossible.

The European Union increasingly appears to be considering a policy of migration externalisation, and the new Pact on Migration and Asylum seems to be embedded in this trend. Delegating European responsibilities toward non-European migrants reveals institutional inefficiency and a lack of confidence. While EU institutions act as decision-making centres in defence, economics, and health, they choose to avert their gaze from an issue that fuels debate and anxiety among European populations. The issue is instrumentalised by far-right parties, which place migration at the core of their electoral campaigns in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Meanwhile, under the blue flag with yellow stars, Libyan authorities—known for their lack of scruples—are tasked with patrolling Europe’s Mediterranean borders and monitoring departures from North Africa.

The libyan scandal

Since 2018, the surveillance agency Frontex has deployed aircraft and drones on behalf of the EU. Yet Libyan authorities also benefit from this system, despite not being entitled to direct access to the agency’s intelligence, which is reserved for member states. Several NGOs uncovered this anomaly following the publication of around ten surveillance images on Libyan coastguard Facebook pages between 2018 and 2021, used to intercept migrant boats. On 8 May 2019, Frontex aircraft provided Libyan coastguards with information on the location of a vessel carrying 70 people.

Guilty of violent and dangerous actions documented in UN Security Council reports—including human trafficking and torture—Libyan actors impose no limits on their methods. NGOs therefore hold the European Union morally responsible. “When you delegate a task or a mission, you cannot ensure it is carried out properly. When it concerns an employee and financial gain, perhaps—but when it is a moral duty affecting the lives of thousands of people, it must be taken seriously,” lamented a member of the NGO SOS Méditerranée.

A union built on solidarity?

The European Union, especially since the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, has sought to secure its borders, better identify and monitor incoming flows, and increase efficiency in combating irregular migration and criminal networks, while making solidarity among member states a priority. Yet the growing trend toward externalising migration management seems to undermine European philosophy and challenges the principle of “universal solidarity towards those who suffer,” as invoked by European Council President Charles Michel.