The Spanish exception in European diplomacy

On January 1 , 2026, Spain celebrated the 40th anniversary of its official entry into the European Union. Long relegated to a secondary role compared to Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, it now plays a completely different part on the European stage. Amid the current proliferation of regional and interstate conflicts, Spain distinguishes itself through decisive diplomatic positions, often at odds with those of other European states . This resurgence is largely due to the actions of Pedro Sánchez. Since his appointment as Prime Minister on June 2, 2018, he has spearheaded a lasting transformation of Spanish foreign policy.

But what does this singularity truly reveal about the role Spain intends to play within the European Union? How do its partners perceive it? And on what doctrinal foundations does this unconventional diplomatic approach rest?

Unwavering support for Ukraine, a break with Israel, rejection of US bases, resistance to NATO demands, and an opening to China : Pedro Sánchez's choices outline a coherent doctrine—that of a committed multilateralism, grounded in international law and challenging the pure balance of power. These choices, sometimes isolated within the EU, place Madrid at the heart of a deeper debate on what Europe's voice should be in the world.

L'Espagne considère la Chine comme un partenaire de l'UE - euronews.com

Spanish foreign policy is guided by a multi-year strategy. Presented in September 2025 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 2025-2028 external action strategy comprises three major components. It presents a "strengthened" Spain, through strategic autonomy and enhanced competitiveness ; a "committed" Spain, particularly to the promotion of multilateralism , development, and environmental protection; and a Spain that "builds" peace and security.

Unwavering support for Ukraine

In line with the European Union's position, Spain continues to provide economic support to Kyiv. Since 2022 and the start of the war in Ukraine, the European Union and its 27 member states have been the primary providers of economic, military, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Spain, under Pedro Sánchez, is one of the largest contributors , notably through the signing of a bilateral agreement with Kyiv in 2024, which includes € 1.129 billion in military aid .

More recently, the Spanish government announced a new military aid program, amounting to one billion euros for 2026, bringing total state aid to over four billion euros since the start of the conflict. For Madrid, this support for Ukraine must be both institutional and material.

Enjoying the presidency of the Council of the European Union from July to December 2023, Spain pushed for Ukraine's candidacy to join the 27. On Wednesday, June 3, 2026, the lifting of the Hungarian veto on the continuation of negotiations allowed Kyiv to take a new step in the accession process.

On this issue, Spain is moving in step with its European partners, particularly France and Germany, which traditionally form the driving force of the Union. This is one of the few strategic convergences at the European level : support for Kyiv is a common rallying point, even if Madrid takes a different stance on other fronts. Spanish influence is also evident in Brussels through Teresa Ribera , Executive Vice-President of the European Commission, whose strong commitment to major European issues illustrates Spain's capacity for influence at the EU level.

The war in the Middle East: a European exception

“ No to war” : this is how Pedro Sánchez, in a speech on March 4, 2026, summarized the Spanish government's position regarding the attacks carried out by the United States and Israel in the Gulf. The Spanish President took a clear and critical stance against the military escalation in the region, firmly condemning the American and Israeli strikes against Iran.

This position contrasts with that of France and Germany, which, while critical of Donald Trump's policies, have adopted a distinctly more cautious line, refraining from explicitly condemning their American and Israeli allies. The Franco-German "European engine" has shown itself ready to partner with Washington, leaving Madrid in a position of relative isolation .

With the aim of promoting lasting peace in the region, Spain was one of the first European countries to officially recognize Palestine in May 2024 , along with Ireland and Norway. Recognition by France followed a year later, in September 2025. Today, 16 of the 27 European Union member states have recognized the State of Palestine, and Spain is one of its most ardent supporters.

This recognition, while partly symbolic, nevertheless carries significant political and diplomatic weight. It isolates the United States and Israel on these issues, while simultaneously granting new legitimacy to Palestine, now established as a full-fledged interlocutor thanks to the creation of a legal framework.

Pedro Sánchez reiterated that, in the case of the Middle East conflict, which he described as a "genocide" —one of the few leaders to use this term—international law cannot be applied selectively. In his address on May 4, he reaffirmed his opposition "to violations of international law, which affect the most vulnerable."

This stance, although unique within the European Union, is a natural extension of its foreign policy: refusal of imposition by force, anchoring in multilateral institutions, and priority given to law over power relations.

The Spanish President is following in the footsteps of his socialist predecessor, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who in 2004 firmly opposed the war in Iraq. Twenty-two years later, Sánchez himself recalls that " The world knows very well what happened after the Iraq War : hasty military decisions led to the collapse of institutions, the rise of terrorism, and lasting instability."

The attacks carried out in Palestine and Iran are just as unpopular in Spain as the Iraqi operation was. According to a DYM survey published in March 2026, 73% of Spaniards oppose "the American and Israeli intervention in Iran."

Spain's diplomatic stance on the Middle East conflict is finally manifested in a severance of relations with Israel . In October 2025, Spanish MPs approved a total arms embargo on all goods to and from Israel. In March 2026, Madrid also recalled its ambassador from Israel.

These measures are part of a series of steps implemented by the Spanish government aimed at " ending the genocide in Gaza." Through these actions, Pedro Sánchez's Spain is attempting to inspire a similar movement in other European countries, and more broadly, in the European Union. The latter has not yet suspended its trade association agreement with Israel. An open letter signed by more than 20 former European ministers on June 10, 2026, urges the European Commission to take action in this regard.

A firm hand against Washington

Spain also stands out for its stance towards American diplomacy . Following Pedro Sánchez's "No to war" campaign, Madrid refused the United States, on March 2, 2026, the right to use air bases located on its territory. To understand the significance of this refusal, it is necessary to recall its context: Washington sought to use these facilities as a logistical base for strikes against Iran , within the framework of Operation Epic Fury , conducted jointly with Israel. The Rota and Morón bases , located in Andalusia and established under an agreement signed in 1953 during Franco's dictatorship, have long symbolized Spain's integration into the transatlantic security architecture.

In response to Spain's refusal, fifteen American tanker aircraft left the two bases and were redeployed to Ramstein Air Base in Germany—where the European position is considered more conciliatory. According to Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, the bases, under Spanish sovereignty, "will not be used for any task that falls outside the scope of the agreement with the United States and that is not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

American diplomacy also focused on revitalizing NATO . On June 22, 2025, an agreement brokered by the United States was signed to increase member states' military spending to 5% of GDP by 2030, up from the previous 2%. At that time, only 11 countries met the initial 2% threshold. Pedro Sánchez formally rejected this agreement , stating that while Spain would continue to honor its NATO commitments, it could not reach the 5% of GDP target.

Social investments are preferred to what Pedro Sánchez calls " military Keynesianism " ( stimulating growth through increased military spending). He intends to preserve the welfare state without increasing the tax burden on the middle class, making national sovereignty the central focus of his defense policy choices.

Sánchez is also aware of a domestic political constraint : his coalition partners, particularly Sumar, are firmly opposed, making any massive budget increase difficult to pass in Parliament. Neither France nor Germany has adopted such a stance of resistance: Berlin, in particular, has undertaken a major rearmament effort since 2022 and has been far more accommodating to American demands. Warsaw, for its part, has deemed the special treatment granted to Spain "unjustified and detrimental to the unity of the alliance."

This refusal to comply with American demands regarding the use of military bases, as well as the rejection of the NATO budget agreement, provoked significant diplomatic tensions with Washington . On March 3, 2026, President Donald Trump declared: " We are going to cut off all trade with Spain; we don't want anything to do with Spain anymore ." This trade represents 40 billion euros per year .

Economist Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, research director at the CNRS, points out, however, that a trade disruption would have a significant impact on the American economy itself. The European Union, and France in particular, has expressed its support for the Spanish government. Spain remains partially protected by the European Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), created in 2023 to address economic threats.

By opposing a unilateral intervention not approved by international bodies, Pedro Sánchez's Spain is firmly defending multilateralism against Washington. Other European countries, on the contrary, have adopted a more cautious approach. Nevertheless, the actions of the American president are increasingly perceived as erratic and excessive, gradually drawing the European Union closer to Spain's position.

The Chinese pivot as a strategic singularity

One of the most striking markers of Spain's exceptional diplomatic approach lies in its relationship with China. Pedro Sánchez made his fourth official visit to Beijing in April 2026, becoming the first European leader to visit since the escalation of global trade tensions linked to the Trump administration's tariffs .

This trip carries significant symbolic weight : while other European heads of state, such as Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Emmanuel Macron, share criticisms of Trump without engaging with Beijing, Madrid is fully embracing a strategic rapprochement with China. Spain's stance contrasts sharply with that of the European Union, which officially classifies China as a " systemic rival ." Pedro Sánchez preferred to describe Beijing as a " partner ," a term that highlights the gap between Spanish diplomacy and the Brussels line.

According to Claudio Feijoo, a China specialist at the Technical University of Madrid, "China perceives Spain as relatively friendly, less confrontational than other countries, and likely more independent from Washington." The April 2026 visit is heavily focused on economic issues . Spain's trade deficit with China reached €42.3 billion in 2025, representing 74% of the country's total deficit.

Sánchez urged Xi Jinping to correct this imbalance, which he deemed " untenable ," while presenting China as a key trading partner. The visit resulted in a package of 19 bilateral agreements aimed at strengthening economic relations between the two countries: opening the Chinese market to Spanish exports and attracting Chinese investment to Spain, particularly in the technology and energy sectors. Furthermore, Chinese investment flows to Spain have jumped from €149 million in 2024 to €643 million in 2025, demonstrating the dynamism of this bilateral relationship.

This approach reveals a clear strategic logic: faced with trade threats from Washington, Madrid is choosing to diversify its partnerships rather than rely on transatlantic dependence . It also illustrates Spain's ability to play several roles simultaneously: calling for greater Chinese trade openness in the name of European interests, while also serving its own national economic interests.

This dual register - national and European - is precisely one of the characteristics of Spanish diplomatic practice according to Sánchez: placing Spanish interests in a European framework, in order to amplify their scope and legitimacy.

Spain in the EU: role, perceptions and tensions

How is Spanish diplomacy perceived by its partners? As an ambivalent diplomacy . On the one hand, Madrid benefits from a form of discreet admiration from certain Mediterranean and Southern European countries that recognize themselves in its defense of the welfare state and sovereignty in the NATO crisis.

Since Spain's growth has become one of the most dynamic in the eurozone, it is no longer perceived as the weak link it may have been in the early 2010s. On the other hand, some of its partners—starting with Poland—consider its deviations from NATO solidarity " unjustified . " Observers note that Spain's diplomatic equidistance can be interpreted as a domestic electoral calculation rather than a genuine long-term European strategy.

There are marked points of convergence and divergence between Spain and its European neighbors. On Ukraine, Spain, France, and Germany share solid military and financial support: this is the foundation of the European consensus. On the Middle East, the divide is more pronounced : Ireland and Norway recognized Palestine at the same time as Spain in May 2024, but Paris only followed suit in September 2025, and Berlin, anchored in a specific relationship to the duty of remembrance with regard to Israel, has been even more reluctant.

On military spending , Madrid stands alone in its outright resistance to the 5% target, while Paris and Berlin are undertaking significant rearmament efforts. Finally, on China, Spain is far more open than most of its partners, whereas Brussels maintains its designation as a "systemic rival."

This contrasting portrait illustrates a Spanish diplomatic practice that can be described as principled pragmatism : strong ideological guidelines (multilateralism, international law, rejection of power politics), coupled with a keen sense of national interests and opportunities to be seized (the opening to China, European leadership on Southern issues). This positioning sometimes places Spain in a position of isolation , excluded from certain centers of international decision-making, but also grants it increasing visibility and credibility , particularly in the Global South.

In the search for political solutions to avoid regional upheaval in the Middle East, the Spanish government insists on the need to forge a common European position . These solutions would involve, in particular, diplomatic de-escalation , as well as respect for international law, and especially the Charter of the United Nations.

Spain is thus affirming its commitment to working towards a world order based on dialogue and cooperation rather than on power dynamics. In this respect, Spanish diplomacy perhaps signals a deeper shift within the European Union , which is called upon to define its own voice on the international stage.